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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., appeals from the 
district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of this action which 
Trump brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), and Securities 
and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 
S 240.10b-5. Trump also appeals the district court's 
subsequent refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over state law claims. For the reasons that follow we agree 
with the district court's conclusion that Trump lacks 
standing, and we will therefore affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Mirage Resorts, Inc., and Trump Hotels and Casino 
Resorts, Inc. own competing casinos in Atlantic City, New 
Jersey. Although Trump brought this action under the 
securities laws, the seeds of this dispute were sown when 
a real estate development was planned in Atlantic City. 
Although our inquiry does not need to address the details 
of the planned development, a brief discussion of it is 
necessary to place the dispute in context. 
 
The action arises from a dispute involving the 
redevelopment of a parcel of land known as the Huron 
North Redevelopment Area ("H-Tract"). The H-Tract is 
located in the Marina District of Atlantic City and is 
comprised of approximately 178 acres, 150 of which are 
owned by Atlantic City. The tract consists of wetlands that 
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were used as a municipal landfill until the 1960's. Trump 
claims that the H-Tract is highly contaminated with 
hazardous substances and is vacant except for a few 
municipally maintained facilities. 
 
In November of 1994, the City Council of Atlantic City 
authorized the City Planning Board to prepare a 
Redevelopment Plan for the H-Tract. On April 12, 1995, the 
City Council of Atlantic City adopted the Redevelopment 
Plan proposed by the Planning Board and began seeking a 
developer for the H-Tract pursuant to that Redevelopment 
Plan. Mirage emerged as a potential developer and proposed 
to build a casino complex on the H-Tract. Thereafter, 
Mirage entered into a series of agreements with the City 
(including a Redevelopment Agreement, and a 
Memorandum of Understanding) regarding the proposed 
development of the H-Tract as a multi-casino resort. The 
Redevelopment Agreement gave Mirage an option to acquire 
and develop the H-Tract as a multi-casino resort in 
exchange for Mirage's undertaking to remediate 
environmental contamination and to pay for the relocation 
of the City's existing facilities on the site. 
 
Shortly before the execution of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Mirage and the City, the Atlantic 
City delegation to the New Jersey State Legislature 
introduced legislation known as the Municipal Landfill Site 
Remediation & Redevelopment Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1E-116.1 - 
116.7 (the "Remediation Act"). The Remediation Act was 
subsequently enacted into law. According to Mirage, the 
Remediation Act allows Mirage to be reimbursed for the 
majority of the closure and remediation costs associated 
with its clean-up of the H-Tract.1 
 
The Redevelopment Agreement conditioned Mirage's 
obligations to develop the H-Tract upon a number of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Remediation Act "permits a developer who closes and remediates 
an eligible site the opportunity to apply for reimbursement of up to 75 
percent of the costs after commencement of a business operation on the 
remediated site. The State makes the reimbursement from a fund 
comprised of one-half of all state sales taxes collected from the business 
on that site." State of New Jersey and The Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, No. ATL-L- 
1373-97, slip opn. at 8-9 (N.J. Law Div., May 14, 1997). 
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contingencies. The most significant contingency for 
purposes of this dispute was the approval and funding by 
the State of New Jersey of a roadway called the"Westside 
Connector." The plans for the Westside Connector include 
the construction of a 2.2 mile long highway connecting the 
Atlantic City Expressway to Brigantine Boulevard, and a 
2,000 foot long tunnel. Trump claims that construction of 
the tunnel portion of the Westside Connector requires the 
acquisition and destruction of nine private homes and more 
than 200 units of federally-assisted low income housing, 47 
of which are currently occupied. Trump also claims that the 
Westside Connector will provide direct access to the H- 
Tract, that its primary purpose is to facilitate the 
development of the H-Tract by Mirage, and that Mirage will 
not proceed with the development of the H-Tract in the 
absence of the Westside Connector. 
 
On September 17, 1996, the New Jersey Department of 
Transportation ("DOT") and Mirage entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding the design and 
construction of the Westside Connector. The Memorandum 
of Understanding was followed by the execution of a Road 
Development Agreement between Mirage, the State of New 
Jersey, acting through the DOT, and the South Jersey 
Transportation Authority ("SJTA"). 
 
The Road Development Agreement reflects a commitment 
by the parties to move forward with the proposed Westside 
Connector, and it defines the respective obligations of the 
parties regarding the proposed construction and details 
various conditions to the closing of the Road Agreement. It 
also sets forth the funding sources for the project, which 
include $65 million in proceeds from bonds issued through 
the South Jersey Transportation Authority ("SJTA") 
repayable from, and collateralized by, parking and 
investment funds collected for use by the Casino 
Reinvestment Development Authority ("CRDA") and $55 
million in the proceeds of bonds issued through the SJTA 
repayable from, and collateralized by, alternative 
investment tax obligations of all casinos that will be located 
on the H-Tract. 
 
Trump currently owns three of the thirteen casinos in 
Atlantic City. One of Trump's casinos, "Trump's Castle," is 
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located in the Marina District near the H-Tract. Trump 
claims that it will be adversely affected by the construction 
of the Westside Connector and the development of the H- 
Tract in a number of ways. The Westside Connector will 
significantly reduce access to Trump's Castle. During 
construction it will effectively block access to Trump's 
Castle for a year or more, and make it difficult for persons 
from within and without the City to get to Trump Hotels' 
Atlantic City casinos. Trump claims that its business will 
thus be seriously injured. In addition, Trump claims that 
the new road will increase traffic flow into the city and 
therefore worsen local air quality conditions and traffic 
congestion which already adversely affect Trump's patrons 
and employees. Trump also alleges that the development 
will endanger the community because the H-Tract is highly 
contaminated. Trump alleges that since the Westside 
Connector will bisect the city, the H-Tract development will 
cause permanent injury to the City's entire Boardwalk area, 
including Trump's Taj Mahal and Palace casinos, into 
which Trump has invested enormous amounts of money. 
 
On March 14, 1997, Trump filed a complaint against 
Mirage, the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey DOT, the 
SJTA, the CRDA and the New Jersey Transportation Trust 
Fund in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. Trump sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
which would effectively bar the construction of the Westside 
Connector and the development of the H-Tract by halting 
the sale of the bonds that are a necessary component of the 
funding scheme. Trump alleged that the funding scheme for 
the planned construction of the Westside Connector and 
the development of the H-Tract would violate numerous 
statutes,2 state law3  and the New Jersey Constitution. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In addition to an allegation of impending securities fraud, Trump's 
complaint also alleged violations of the following federal statutes: 
Section 
404 of the Clear Water Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1344; the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. S 403; the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 
23 U.S.C. S 109 and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S 7506. The district 
court granted defendants' 12(b)(6) motion as to those claims and Trump 
has not appealed from the dismissal of those claims. The district court 
dismissed the Clean Water Act because Trump failed to comply with the 
act's notice requirement; dismissed the Rivers and Harbors Act claim 
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However, we are only concerned with Trump's allegations 
that the funding mechanism violates the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), Securities and 
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5, 
and Article IV, S 7, P 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. 
 
The defendants initially moved to dismiss Trump's 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) alleging that the 
complaint failed to state a claim. Simultaneously, they filed 
a complaint in the Law Division of the Superior Court of 
New Jersey naming Trump as a defendant and seeking a 
declaration that the statutory provisions which allowed for 
CRDA funding of various projects were constitutional.4 
State of New Jersey and the Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority v. Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts, 
Inc., No. ATL-L-1373-97 ("State litigation"). 
 
On May 1, 1997, the district court dismissed all of the 
federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage 
Resorts, Inc., 963 F.Supp. 395 (D.N.J. 1997). This appeal 
followed. However, Trump only appeals from the district 
court's dismissal of its 10b-5 claim and the refusal to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the New Jersey 
constitutional claim. The district court held that Trump had 
no standing to seek injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5 
because the claimed injury was too indirect and remote 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because the Act provides no private cause of action; dismissed the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act claim because Trump's complaint admitted that 
no federal funds would be used to fund the project; and dismissed the 
Clean Air Act claim because Trump failed to allege federal funding and 
failed to plead compliance with the statute's notice requirement. 
 
3. The complaint also alleged a violation of the New Jersey Coastal Area 
Facility Review Act, N.J.S.A. SS 13:19-1, et seq. The district court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that state law claim 
and Trump has not appealed from that decision. 
 
4. The defendants believed that Trump's federal litigation created a cloud 
that had to be removed before the CRDA could issue the bonds. 
Appellees' Br. at 6. They also believed that the federal court did not 
have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the state constitutional question raised 
by Trump in the federal litigation. Id. 
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from the alleged securities fraud. Id. at 402. In refusing to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Trump's state 
constitutional challenge, the district court reasoned that 
"state courts should be given the opportunity to interpret 
their state constitutions," and since "[o]nly the New Jersey 
Supreme Court can give an authoritative construction of 
the New Jersey Constitution." Id. at 408, the court 
exercised its discretion and refused to hear Trump's state 
law claims.5 
 
II. 
 
Our standard of review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 
is plenary. When reviewing a motion to dismiss for want of 
standing, we must accept as true all material allegations of 
the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of 
the plaintiff. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). A 
complaint should be dismissed only if, after accepting as 
true all of the facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing 
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff 's favor, no relief 
could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the 
allegations of the complaint. ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 
F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. 
 
Trump argues that the use of bonds issued by the SJTA 
as a part of the funding mechanism violates Article IV, S 7, 
P 2 of the New Jersey Constitution, which Trump argues 
strictly limits the use of casino derived revenues to projects 
and programs that benefit senior and disabled citizens of 
the State of New Jersey. Trump further argues that neither 
the CRDA nor the SJTA plan to disclose this purported 
constitutional infirmity to potential purchasers of the 
bonds. Thus, argues Trump, the issuance of the bonds 
would constitute securities fraud in violation of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and the Securities 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On May 14, 1977, the New Jersey state court held that the statutes 
challenged by Trump in the federal action were valid under the New 
Jersey constitution. Trump has appealed that decision and briefs on the 
appeal have been filed with the appellate division of the state court. 
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and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. Consequently, 
Trump seeks to enjoin the sale of the bonds.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although we need not dwell upon the intricacies of New Jersey's 
casino financing laws as part of our resolution of this appeal, this 
dispute is best understood in context with applicable state statutes, and 
relevant provisions of the New Jersey Constitution. Accordingly, we 
briefly describe them here in the margin: 
 
On November 2, 1976, New Jersey voters approved an amendment to 
the New Jersey Constitution which permitted the Legislature to authorize 
the establishment and operation of gambling casinos in Atlantic City. 
However, the amendment required that any such legislation 
 
       shall provide for the State revenues derived therefrom to be 
applied 
       solely for the purpose of providing funding for reductions in 
property 
       taxes, rental, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities 
charges 
       of, eligible senior citizens and disabled residents of the State, 
and 
       for additional or expanded health services or benefits or 
       transportation services or benefits to eligible senior citizens and 
       disabled residents, in accordance with such formulae as the 
       Legislature shall by law provide. 
 
N.J. Const. art. IV, S 7, P 2, subparagraph D. The 1977 Casino Control 
Act was enacted pursuant to this amendment. The Casino Control Act 
established a tax on a casino's "gross revenues." N.J.S.A. 5:12-24. All 
funds derived from this tax were to be placed in a special fund referred 
to as the "Casino Revenue Fund." N.J.S.A. 5:12-145(a), which would be 
used exclusively for programs to assist the elderly and disabled. N.J.S.A. 
5:12-145(c). The Act also required casino licensees whose gross revenues 
exceeded the capital cost of constructing their casinos to make 
additional investments in Atlantic City. Any licensee that failed to make 
the required investments would be subject to an alternative investment 
tax on gross revenues dedicated to the Casino Revenue Fund. N.J.S.A. 
5:12-144(b)(3); see State of New Jersey and the Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., No. ATL-L- 
1373-97, slip opn. at 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., May 14, 1997). 
 
In 1984, the Casino Reinvestment Act of 1984 was enacted to spur 
investment. State of New Jersey and the Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority, at 6. The Act created the Casino Reinvestment 
Development Authority ("CRDA") to accelerate development and to 
provide a focus for reinvestment by the casinos. N.J.S.A. 5:12-153. The 
CRDA "was charged to maintain public confidence in the casino 
gambling industry as a unique tool of urban development for Atlantic 
City; to directly facilitate the redevelopment of existing blighted areas; 
and to address pressing social and economic needs by providing eligible 
projects in which casino licensees could invest." State of New Jersey, at 
6. 
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
provides: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
       indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
       of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility 
       of any national securities exchange . . . 
 
        (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
       or sale of any security, . . . any manipulative or 
       deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
       such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
       prescribe . . . in the public interest or for the protection 
       of investors. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b)(emphasis added). Securities and 
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 was promulgated 
pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act. That Rule provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In 1993, the New Jersey Legislature amended the Casino Control Act 
by enacting the Parking Fee Act "to accelerate the CRDA's efforts to 
develop the Atlantic City `corridor region' (the infrastructure connecting 
the Atlantic City Expressway to the Boardwalk)." State of New Jersey, at 
7. The Legislature imposed a $2.00 fee on consumers who parked at 
casino-controlled parking facilities and required that $1.50 of this 
amount to be remitted to the CRDA whether or not the consumer used 
or entered the casino facility. N.J.S.A. 5:12-173.3. Id. Proceeds are 
deposited in a special account in the State Treasury to be used for, 
among other things, any project that the CRDA determines is "related to 
improving highways, roads, infrastructures, traffic regulation and public 
safety" in the corridor region. N.J.S.A. 5:12-173.4. The Legislature also 
authorized the CRDA to sell bonds to finance such projects and to pledge 
parking fee proceeds to repay the indebtedness. N.J.S.A. 5:12-173.6, 
173.7. 
 
Mirage, the State of New Jersey and its various agencies entered into 
the Road Agreement under certain of these New Jersey statutes, viz., 
N.J.S.A. 5:12-173.1 - 173.7 (requiring the CRDA to collect parking fees 
to fund "eligible projects") and N.J.S.A. 5:12-144.1 and N.J.S.A. 5:12-173 
(requiring casino licensees both to purchase bonds issued by the CRDA 
and to make investments in eligible projects approved by the CRDA). In 
one of its state law causees of action, Trump asked the district court to 
declare these enabling statutes unconstitutional under the New Jersey 
Constitution. However, the district court refused to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge and 
dismissed it without prejudice. 
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       It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
       indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
       of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
       of any national securities exchange, 
 
       (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
       defraud, 
 
       (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
       to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
       make the statements made, in the light of the 
       circumstances under which they were made, not 
       misleading, or 
 
       (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
       which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
       upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
       sale of any security. 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (emphasis added). For our purposes, 
the operative phrase in both the statute and the regulation 
is "in connection with the purchase and sale." Trump does 
not allege that it intends to purchase the bonds when, and 
if, they are issued. Thus, the threshold issue is whether 
Trump has standing to bring this action. 
 
A. 
 
"In essence the question of standing is whether the 
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the 
dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 498 (1975). Standing "subsumes a blend of 
constitutional requirements and prudential considerations." 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 
(1982). Obviously, satisfying the Article III "case or 
controversy" requirement is the "irreducible constitutional 
minimum" of standing.7 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Article III constitutional standing 
contains three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The constitutional dimensions of the standing question bear a close 
relationship to the questions of ripeness and mootness. See Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10. 
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an injury in fact -- an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of -- the injury has to be fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not 
the result of the independent action of some third party not 
before the court; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision. Id. at 560-61 (citations, internal 
quotations, brackets and ellipses omitted). 
 
In addition to the " `immutable requirements of Article III,' 
the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential 
principles that bear on the question of standing." Bennett v. 
Spear, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997) (citation 
omitted). They are: (1) "the plaintiff generally must assert 
his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his 
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties," Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474 
(citation omitted); (2) "even when the plaintiff has alleged 
redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of 
Article III, the federal courts will not adjudicate abstract 
questions of wide public significance which amount to 
generalized grievances pervasively shared and most 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches," Id. 
at 474-75 (citation omitted); and (3) "the plaintiff 's 
complaint must fall within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question." Id. (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
It is this latter "zone of interests" consideration which is 
of paramount concern here. Although the "zone of interests" 
consideration had its origin in the context of judicial review 
proceedings under the Administrative Procedures Act 
("APA"), see Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), it is now 
clear that it applies "in suits not involving review of federal 
administrative action," and it is one "among other 
prudential standing requirements of general application." 
Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1161. 
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B. 
 
It is by no means certain that Trump has alleged 
sufficient injury to achieve Article III standing here. 
However, even if the allegations of fraud in the issuance of 
securities that Trump does not intend to purchase are 
sufficient for purposes of Article III, they clearly fall outside 
the zone of interests protected by the SJTA, section 10(b) of 
the Securities Act, and Rule 10b-5. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that only a purchaser or 
seller of a security has standing to bring a private 10b-5 
securities fraud action for money damages. Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
However, Trump is not bringing a private damages action 
under 10b-5. Rather, Trump seeks injunctive relief against 
what it claims is an impending 10b-5 violation, and it 
claims standing based on a pre-Blue Chip Stamps decision 
of this court, Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 
1970). In Kahan, we carved out a narrow exception to the 
"Birnbaum rule" and held that the non-purchasing or non- 
selling plaintiff of a security has standing to request 
injunctive relief for a 10b-5 violation. 
 
The Birnbaum rule takes its name from Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), which 
was decided twenty-three years before the Supreme Court's 
Blue Chip Stamps decision. In Birnbaum the court 
examined the legislative history of securities legislation and 
concluded that Rule 10b-5 "extended protection only to the 
defrauded purchaser or seller" of the security at issue. Id. 
at 464. Thus was born the Birnbaum purchaser/seller rule. 
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court expressly declared 
that "Birnbaum was rightly decided." 421 U.S. at 731. 
 
Kahan was decided eighteen years after Birnbaum, but 
five years before Blue Chip Stamps. In Kahan we reviewed 
then existing precedent in the Second Circuit and 
concluded that, despite the Birnbaum rule, Second Circuit 
jurisprudence allowed a non-purchasing or non-selling 
plaintiff to bring an action for injunctive relief under 10b-5. 
We stated "[t]he purchase-sale requirement must be 
interpreted so that the broad design of the Exchange Act, to 
prevent inequitable and unfair practices on securities 
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exchanges and over-the-counter markets, is not frustrated 
by the use of novel or atypical transactions." 424 F.2d at 
171. Accordingly, we held that 
 
       [n]either the language of S 10(b) and Rule 10 b-5 nor 
       the policy they were designed to effectuate mandate 
       adherence to a strict purchaser-seller requirement so 
       as to preclude suits for [injunctive] relief if a plaintiff 
       can establish a causal connection between the 
       violations alleged and the plaintiff's loss. 
 
Id., at 173. 
 
Trump argues that this "relaxed standing" rule of Kahan 
survived Blue Chip Stamps. Mirage argues to the contrary 
citing Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984) to 
support its position that Blue Chip Stamps sounded the 
death knell for the "relaxed standing" rule. In Cowin, the 
court held that the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller 
limitation applies with equal force to equitable actions. 
 
We have not, heretofore, squarely addressed this issue. In 
Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 
1976), a panel of this court assumed that the "relaxed 
standing" rule of Kahan survived Blue Chip Stamps, but 
held that the case before it did not fit into that rule. 540 
F.2d at 194. In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 
186 n.15 (3d Cir. 1981), overruled in part on other grounds, 
In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 
1537 (3d Cir. 1988)(en banc), we wrote that Blue Chip 
Stamps precludes a non-purchaser or non-seller from 
seeking injunctive relief for an impending 10b-5 violation. 
However, that reference is clearly dicta, and not part of the 
holding. 649 F.2d at 187 n.15. 
 
Thus, we have yet to decide whether a non-purchasing or 
non-selling plaintiff continues to have standing to seek 
injunctive relief for an alleged 10b-5 violation after Blue 
Chip Stamps. However, resolution of that question must 
await yet another day as we need not now decide it to 
resolve the case at bar. Whether or not the relaxed standing 
rule survives Blue Chip Stamps, the injuries that Trump 
alleges here are not within the zone of protection 
established by S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 regardless of the 
relief sought. Furthermore, Trump has not established the 
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prerequisite nexus between the injuries it claims, and the 
securities violations that it alleges. Even under Kahan's 
rule of relaxed standing, one seeking injunctive relief had to 
establish a "causal connection between the violations 
alleged" and the loss claimed. See Kahan, 424 F.2d at 173. 
As noted above, there we stated that we would not strictly 
adhere to the "purchase-seller requirement . . . if a plaintiff 
could establish a causal connection between the violations 
alleged and plaintiff's loss." (emphasis added). Here, Trump 
has not established any such causal link. Accordingly, we 
hold that the injuries that Trump alleges are insufficient to 
confer standing to seek relief under either Blue Chip 
Stamps, or our holding in Kahan. 
 
Trump has no intention of purchasing the bonds, and, 
therefore, is not a member of the universe of potential 
investors.8 Consequently, it cannot demonstrate that it 
would suffer an injury sufficiently connected to the 
securities fraud it alleges.9 Trump argues, in part, that it 
must be allowed to bring this action because of the unique 
circumstances surrounding an offering of government 
bonds. At oral argument Trump suggested that its role in 
enjoining this sale of securities without proper disclosure is 
tantamount to acting as a private attorney general on 
behalf of the investing public, and the public in general, 
and this is sufficient to confer standing. However, Trump is 
obviously aware of the purported infirmity that it alleges in 
this offering. The claimed constitutional infirmity was the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In view of Trump's allegations, it would not further Trump's position 
to allege an intention to purchase as Trump could not, in good faith, 
assert that it had relied upon the alleged fraudulent conduct. In order to 
state a securities fraud claim under S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a private 
plaintiff must plead that he or she "reasonably relied on the 
misrepresentation or omission and . . . consequently suffered damage." 
In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 710 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
9. Trump is not at all in the same position as was Kahan in Kahan v. 
Rosenstiel. Kahan was a minority shareholder and, assuming the truth 
of the allegations in his complaint, was being offered less money for his 
shares than was the majority shareholder. Thus, Kahan stood to suffer 
a loss in the value of his investment because of the alleged securities 
fraud. Trump cannot demonstrate a loss from an investment it will never 
make. 
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basis of state court litigation and it must now be disclosed 
to prospective purchasers. That disclosure adequately 
protects the investing public without a tortured standing 
analysis under federal securities laws. Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 reflect a "strong federal interest .. . in ensuring 
a proper flow of information between the parties to a 
securities transaction." Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 
644, 649 (3d Cir. 1991)(quoting Healey v. Catalyst Recovery 
of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir. 1980)). As 
we wrote in Kahan: 
 
       The Act was designed to eliminate deceptive and unfair 
       practices in security trading and to protect the public 
       from inaccurate, incomplete and misleading 
       information. The thrust of the Act and the decisions 
       interpreting it is to give the investing public the 
       opportunity to make knowing and intelligent decisions 
       regarding the purchase and sale of securities. 
 
Kahan, at 173 (emphasis added). 
 
Aside from nebulous allegations of environmental harm 
and harm to the Atlantic City community, Trump's 
essential complaint is that the proceeds from the sale of the 
bonds will be used to build a highway and tunnel which 
will funnel traffic from the Atlantic City Expressway to the 
multi-casino complex Trump's competitor will build on the 
H-Tract. The highway and tunnel, once completed, will be 
a boon for Mirage and Trump fears economic loss. 
Admittedly, there is a highly attenuated connection between 
the funding scheme and Trump's claimed "injury". However, 
that "injury" is much too tenuous to be regarded as arising 
from the alleged securities fraud. The injury results from 
the highway that will bring traffic to Trump's competitor. 
Trump's assertion that the injuries are within the zone of 
interests protected by S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires us to 
stretch reality as well as precedent past the breaking point. 
We refuse to do so. Accordingly, we hold that Trump has no 
standing to seek injunctive relief against the issuance of the 
bonds. 
 
IV. 
 
Two small matters remain. First, Trump claims that the 
district court abused its discretion by "failing to provide 
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Trump with an opportunity to supply further particularized 
allegations of fact to support its standing." Appellant's Br. 
at 47. However, Trump never requested leave of the district 
court to amend or supplement its complaint. Therefore, it 
cannot raise that issue on appeal. Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 
100, 103 (6th Cir. 1994)(where plaintiff never requested 
leave to amend in the district court, that argument is not 
properly before appellate court). 
 
Second, as noted above, Trump has appealed from the 
district court's decision to refrain from exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claim that the 
proposed funding scheme violates the New Jersey 
Constitution. However, supplemental jurisdiction is 
exercised as a matter of discretion. See Borough of West 
Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). A 
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
a state law claim where "the claim raises a novel or 
complex issue of state law." 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(1). Clearly, 
the question of whether the proposed funding scheme for 
the Westside Connector violates the New Jersey 
Constitution is a complex issue of state law which is better 
left to the New Jersey courts to determine. See Doe v. 
Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997)(declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, in part, "out of respect 
for the right of a state court system to construe that state's 
own constitution."). Thus, we believe that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law constitutional 
claim. 
 
V. 
 
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court 
will be affirmed. 
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